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I. INTRODUCTION
The anticircumvention rules—which Congress enacted in 19981 to
bolster the implementation of technological protection measures
(TPMs) designed to prevent unauthorized use of copyright-protected
materials—have been subjected to unrelenting criticism.2 In this Ar* Associate Professor, Wayne State University Law School. I wish to acknowledge
the helpful comments and suggestions that I received from Omri Ben-Shahar, Noah Hall,
Peter Hammer, and Richard Johnson. ©2006 John A. Rothchild.
1. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000).
2. The critics are numerous. For a sampling, see June M. Besek, Anti-Circumvention
Laws and Copyright: A Report from the Kernochan Center for Law, Media and the Arts, 27
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 385, 467-69 (2004) (listing the main categories of criticisms of the anticircumvention rules); Reto M. Hilty, Five Lessons About Copyright in the Information Society: Reaction of the Scientific Community to Over-Protection and What Policy Makers
Should Learn, 53 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 103, 113-18 (2006) (criticizing the rules as
granting copyright owners too much power, interfering with the free movement of goods, curtailing consumer prerogatives, and so on); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright:
Digital Technology, Private Copying, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L.
REV. 813, 844 (2001) (“[T]he [anticircumvention rules] replace[] the public interest in the
creation and dissemination of works of authorship with the private interest of maximizing
the revenue of copyright owners.”); Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital
Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 519 (1999); ELECT. FRONTIER FOUND., UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: SEVEN YEARS UNDER
THE DMCA 1 (2006), http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/DMCA_unintended_v4.pdf (criticizing the
rules for interfering with free expression, scientific research, fair use, and competition).
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ticle I add another critical voice to the chorus, but from a new perspective. I argue not for modification or elimination of the rules, but
rather for complementary legislation that corrects a feature of the
rules that has until now been overlooked: implementing the technological protections that the anticircumvention rules promote imposes
costs on persons who are not parties to the transactions that give rise to
the costs. The fact that these harms are externalized leads to an oversupply of TPMs. Standard economic theory calls for a regulatory response that brings about a reduction in the use of TPMs to an efficient
level. My proposal is to implement some such regulatory response.
My argument proceeds as follows. Since my proposal treats creative authorship as a productive activity subject to the usual laws of
supply and demand, I begin in Part II by countering the doctrine of
copyright exceptionalism—the naïve view that creative authorship,
being a public good, is uniquely subject to unauthorized appropriation and therefore sui generis in the public policy issues it presents. I
do this by showing that virtually all productive activity, not just that
associated with creative authorship, is subject to unauthorized appropriation in varying degrees and, therefore, has a public-good aspect. I then make a terminological shift: rather than continuing to refer to the public-good aspect of creative authorship, I speak of the
positive externalities generated by that activity. These two formulations are, as I explain, simply two different ways of characterizing a
single phenomenon. Thus, employing the new terminology, I show
that nearly all productive activity generates positive externalities.
The advantage of using the rubric of externalities is that it helps
us to recognize two parallels that are crucial to my argument. The
first is the parallel between the positive externalities generated by
creative authorship and those resulting from other types of productive activity. The second is the parallel between the negative externalities resulting from the use of TPMs and the negative externalities arising from other types of productive activity. Recognition of
these parallels supports my argument that similar regulatory regimes should be applied to the realms of creative authorship and of
productive activity more generally, as far as control of externalities is
Of course, the anticircumvention rules also have their supporters. See BRUCE A.
LEHMAN, INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE
NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON
INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY
RIGHTS
230
(1995),
available
at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/doc/ipnii/ipnii.pdf (proposing enactment of anticircumvention rules); Jane C. Ginsburg, Legal Protection of Technological Measures Protecting Works of Authorship: International Obligations and the US Experience, 29 COLUM. J.L.
& ARTS 11, 12 (2005) (“[L]egal protection for technological measures has helped foster new
business models that make works available to the public at a variety of price points and
enjoyment options, without engendering the ‘digital lockup’ and other copyright owner
abuses that many had feared.”).
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concerned. Such regulatory parity is already in effect in the form of
legal regimes that allow creative authors and other producers to retain some of what would otherwise be positive externalities of their
activities—copyright law in the case of the former and patent, trade
secrecy, trademark, and contract laws in the case of the latter. My
argument is that the same parity should apply in the case of negative
externalities, implying a regulatory requirement that publishers implementing TPMs internalize the external costs of their use.
In Part III, I demonstrate that publishers’ use of TPMs creates
several types of negative externalities. Specifically, TPMs bring
about a contraction of the public domain, reduce access to creative
works through elimination of a market in used copies of those works,
and potentially interfere with the working of a competitive marketplace. As with the positive externalities previously discussed, this
characteristic of TPMs is shared with a variety of other productive
activities that cause harms to third parties. Perhaps the most familiar such harm is pollution. Standard economic theory holds that if
these harms are not internalized to the producer, they will be oversupplied—hence the range of regulatory responses to pollution. Applying the same reasoning, I argue that if the externalized harms
caused by TPM use are not internalized to the publisher, TPMs will
be overproduced—that is, publishers will implement TPMs in a
quantity higher than that which optimizes societal welfare.
Thus, in Part IV I argue that there is a need for regulatory action
aimed at confronting publishers with the externalized harms resulting from their TPM usage. Drawing from regulatory approaches that
are routinely applied to other types of productive activities that create negative externalities, I canvass four possible approaches: traditional command-and-control regulation, reliance upon Coasean bargaining, Pigouvian taxes, and cap-and-trade allowances. The discussion addresses the advantages and disadvantages of each approach
and—while recognizing that information shortfalls make any approach experimental at best—recommends implementing the last of
these, cap-and-trade, as being the most market-oriented.
II. AGAINST COPYRIGHT EXCEPTIONALISM
The conventional justification for granting authors control over
certain uses of their creative works is that in the absence of such control prospective authors would lack the incentive to create. The product of creative authorship, it is said, is a public good. It is a truism of
economic theory that public goods will not be produced or will be un-
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derproduced unless the government takes some role in producing
them or encouraging production by the private sector.3
In this Part, I argue that analysis of public policy with respect to
copyright must begin with the recognition that the provision of works
of authorship is not uniquely afflicted with the incentives problem
that derives from its status as a public good. To the contrary, most
productive activities feature, to varying extents, a public-good aspect;
or, to make the same point in terms that facilitate analysis, most
productive activity results in positive externalities.
Placing creative authorship within a broader context of productive
activity that involves externalities will lead, in Part IV, to my proposal that the public policy tools that are traditionally applied to
counter negative externalities should also be applied in formulating
copyright policy.
A. The Public-Good Nature of Creative Authorship
Creative authorship is conventionally regarded as a public good,
being both nonrival4 and, in the absence of the legal protection offered by copyright laws, nonexcludable.5 A work of authorship is nonrival because, for example, the fact that one person is reading a book
does not prevent another person from reading another copy of the
same book. A work of authorship is nonexcludable to the extent that
it is impractically expensive to prevent others from copying it.6 The
problem with public goods is that in the absence of government intervention, they are undersupplied, since the producer will find it difficult, at least under traditional business models,7 to receive payment
for its efforts.8
3. See RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC
GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS 3 (2d ed. 1996) (locating this insight in the writing of Adam
Smith).
4. A good is nonrival if one person’s use of it does not interfere with another person’s use.
5. A good is nonexcludable if it is impossible or prohibitively expensive to limit access to the good. The definition of a “public good” as one that is nonrival and nonexcludable
is a common one, but there are differing views on what makes a good public, even among
writers of basic economics textbooks: some require only nonrivalry, some only nonexcludability, and some introduce the factor of indivisibility. STEPHEN SHMANSKE, PUBLIC GOODS,
MIXED GOODS, AND MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 191 n.1 (1991).
6. Although works of authorship may be nonrival and nonexcludable, the physical
instantiations of them, which in most cases are required for them to have any utility, are
both rival and excludable. See Kenneth D. Goldin, Equal Access vs. Selective Access: A Critique of Public Goods Theory, in THE THEORY OF MARKET FAILURE 69, 82 (Tyler Cowen ed.
1988) (“Ideas are of little value unless they [sic] distributed and/or used. Selective access to
the distribution of ideas is easy (by charging fees for books or demonstrations) . . . .”); see
also NIVA ELKIN-KOREN & ELI M. SALZBERGER, LAW, ECONOMICS AND CYBERSPACE 51
(2004).
7. The traditional model for publishers of creative authorship involves locking up
one’s content and allowing access to it for a fee. In many contexts it has proven feasible to
make money through some other business model, making copyright largely irrelevant to
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Thus, the conventional utilitarian justification for the legal protection provided by copyright is that it is needed to overcome the
public-good problem. The standard economic analysis of copyright
posits that the cost of producing an exemplar of a work of authorship
has two components: the fixed cost of creating the work and the variable cost of producing copies of it. For publishing copies to be a profitable endeavor, the publisher must be able to charge a price that
covers both of these components of its costs. This requires charging
more than the marginal cost of producing a copy.
If a competitor can costlessly appropriate the value of the author’s
creative effort, it can make money selling copies at the marginal cost
of production (plus an increment that yields a normal rate of return).
This is ruinous for the original publisher, which must either meet the
competitor’s price and never recover its fixed costs of creation or
charge enough to recover those costs but see its sales drop to zero as
it is undercut by the competition. The prospective author will calculate ex ante that authorship may be fulfilling but will not pay the
rent and will instead direct his efforts to some more remunerative
(though quite possibly less socially beneficial) endeavor. Society will
then have to look elsewhere for sources of creative expression.
Copyright saves the day, granting authors (and, via transfer of
copyright ownership, their publishers) the right to exclude others
from certain uses of the fruits of their creative efforts. Potential competitors are precluded from appropriating costlessly the bulk of the
economic value of what the author creates—precluded, that is, from
copying or adapting the work or from distributing, performing, or
displaying the work publicly.9
B. Partial Public Goodness
One key to recognizing the parallel between creative authorship
and other types of productive activity with respect to their publicgood nature is the observation that public goodness is not a categorical attribute but is rather a characteristic that may be present to

the incentive to produce. For example, many website operators make money without limiting access to their content, such as by allowing advertisements to be posted on their
pages or by driving business to affiliated websites. For a taxonomy of e-commerce
business models, see Michael Rappa, Business Models on the Web,
http://digitalenterprise.org/models/models.html (last visited July 3, 2007).
8. B. CURTIS EATON & DIANE F. EATON, MICROECONOMICS 470 (2d ed. 1991) (“In
many circumstances, if pure public goods are to be produced at all, they will be produced
by some public authority rather than by profit-seeking firms, because no firm can profit by
providing a nonexcludable good.”).
9. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic
Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989).
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varying degrees.10 The enjoyment I receive from sitting in the sun on
an unspoiled beach may not be lessened if you pull up a chair at
some distance from me, but it would be somewhat reduced if ten people sat nearby engaging in noisy activities and would be ruined if a
thousand others had the same idea—so aesthetic goods may be partially nonrival.11 If I want to prevent strangers from filching peaches
from the trees in my front yard, I can at minimal cost put up a “Private
Property, No Trespassing” sign to exclude many of them, but to exclude
all of them, I would have to hire a security guard at prohibitive cost—so
my home-grown peaches are only partially nonexcludable.
Creative authorship too may exhibit degrees of excludability.12
The excludability of a good depends on several factors. One such factor is the cost of controlling access to the good in relation to its value.
A valuable trade secret, such as the recipe for the eleven herbs and
spices used in making Kentucky Fried Chicken, is highly excludable
because its value to Yum! Brands, Inc., the current owner of the KFC
brand, is very high, making the company’s precautions against disclosure cost effective.13 A studio-produced movie, on the other hand,
is only partially excludable, because the cost of perfect exclusion—
keeping the film in a vault, with no public showing or distribution—
is too high. Copying the design of a boat hull or a semiconductor chip
is not cheap, but it is much less expensive than creating the design
oneself, so those designs are highly nonexcludable with respect to the
relevant copiers.14 In recognition of that fact, Congress enacted sui
generis protection of both types of designs.15

10. See DAVID N. HYMAN, PUBLIC FINANCE: A CONTEMPORARY APPLICATION OF
THEORY TO POLICY 134-38 (4th ed. 1993); Yochai Benkler, An Unhurried View of Private
Ordering in Information Transactions, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2063, 2066 (2000).
11. This feature of partial nonrivalry is sometimes referred to as “congestion.” See
SHMANSKE, supra note 5, at 25.
12. I limit the discussion here to degrees of excludability, passing over the possibility
of degrees of nonrivalry, since it is excludability that determines whether a prospective author will have an economic incentive to create.
13. The secret blend of herbs and spices is produced by two different suppliers, each of
which knows the recipe for and produces only one portion of the blend. KFC Corp. v.
Marion-Kay Co., 620 F. Supp. 1160, 1163 (S.D. Ind. 1985). The two portions are then
combined and provided to KFC franchisees. Id.; see also Wikipedia, KFC,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/KFC (last visited July 3, 2007) (“The Colonel’s ‘secret recipe’ of
11 herbs and spices is marketed as one of the best-kept trade secrets. The original handwritten recipe is purportedly locked in a vault in Louisville, Kentucky, with partial copies
elsewhere as backup.”).
14. For an economic analysis of copying the design of boat hulls and semiconductor
chips, see Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse
Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575, 1591-1607 (2002).
15. For boat design protection, see Vessel Hull Design Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 105304, 112 Stat. 2905 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 1301-32, 1338, 1400,
1498 (2000)). According to a report from the Copyright Office evaluating the Act, “Much of
the support for enacting the VHDPA was based on the fact that there are strong incentives
for pirates to infringe boat designs because of the enormous resources that must be in-
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The extent to which creative authorship is excludable also depends on its format and on the relevant copying technology, which
together determine the cost and feasibility of making copies that are
close substitutes. Before the development of movable type, the expression contained in a book was relatively excludable, since it was
costly to make a copy. In an age of photocopy machines and computerized typesetting equipment, literary expression is less excludable,
since copies that are close substitutes can often be made at a cost
that is less than their economic value. Text on a website may be
practically nonexcludable, since the cost to make a perfect copy is
virtually zero and the cost of excluding unauthorized users (such as
by adding password protection) may be prohibitive because it deters
desired viewers.
A sculptural work is more excludable than a two-dimensional
artwork, since the available substitutes (photographs, drawings) are
not close ones and the cost of duplicating a sculpture is much higher
than that of copying most two-dimensional works.
Thus, when discussing the public-good nature of an activity, we
should speak of degrees of public goodness. This is, however, linguistically inconvenient. Fortunately, there is a related concept that will
allow us to discuss the issues in less convoluted terms—the concept
of externality. An externality exists when the activity of an economic
agent affects the welfare of another party in a manner that is outside
the legal control of that other party.16 Thus, a producer’s decision to
implement a particular mode of production results in a positive externality when it has the effect of producing some benefit for a producer or consumer who is not a party to any transaction involving
the resulting product. In other words, if the consequence of an activity is a public good, then that activity has positive external-

vested in research to develop new designs or innovations.” U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE & U.S.
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, THE VESSEL HULL DESIGN PROTECTION ACT: OVERVIEW
AND ANALYSIS 19 (2003).
For semiconductor design protection, see Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3347 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-14 (2000)); Altera Corp. v. Clear Logic, Inc., 424 F.3d 1079, 1081 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Pirate firms can strip
the layers of a semiconductor chip and replicate the design at a cost substantially lower
than the original firm’s investment.”).
16. See SHMANSKE, supra note 5, at 30 (An externality is “when some production, consumption, or exchange activity that occurs between agents affects the utility function or
production function of some noncontracting agent.”). To be an externality, the effect on
third parties must not be reflected in the price of the transaction. See H YMAN , supra
note 10, at 91 (“Externalities are costs or benefits of market transactions not reflected
in prices.”).
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ities.17 It is the nonexcludability of public goods that gives rise to
positive externalities.18
C. Creative Authorship as a Species of Productive Activity
The discussion above has established that (1) the public-good nature of creative authorship is the conventional justification of legal
protection of copyright19 and (2) creative authorship is a partial, not a
pure, public good—a characteristic that we can describe more conveniently by saying that authorship, in the absence of legal protection against unauthorized use, generates positive externalities to
various extents depending on context.20 Copyright serves the purpose of enabling an author to internalize some of the economic
value of her creations that would otherwise be available to all takers as an externality.
The argument of this Section builds on the above points by showing that generation of positive externalities is not unique to creative
authorship; on the contrary, it is characteristic of many other types
of productive activity. As is the case with creative authorship, the existence of these externalities interferes with producers’ incentives; if
externalization of benefits prevents prospective producers from receiving a reasonable return, they will lack an ex ante incentive to engage in productive activity. To prevent this from happening, legal
rules allow ordinary producers to internalize some of those externalized benefits, just as copyright offers this capability to authors.
The Section continues by identifying those factors which make
the existence of positive externalities more or less of a problem
from the standpoint of assuring that producers—both authors and
industrialists—have the optimal economic incentive to engage in
productive activity.
1. Authors and Other Producers
Many types of productive activity give rise to positive externalities. Consider the production of an archetypal hard good—the
economist’s “widget”—consisting of an item that must be conceived,
17. See CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 3, at 6 (“public goods can be thought of as special cases of externalities”).
18. For examples of the use of this terminology in the copyright context, see Julie E.
Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 347, 366 (2005) (“It is
widely acknowledged that some fair uses, including many transformative uses, create positive externalities from which society as a whole benefits greatly . . . .”); Alfred C. Yen, A
Preliminary Economic Analysis of Napster: Internet Technology, Copyright Liability, and
the Possibility of Coasean Bargaining, 26 U. DAYTON L. REV. 247, 262 (2001) (“To the extent that external benefits conferred on free riders cause the underproduction of copyrightable subject matter, copyright law can be used to internalize those external benefits . . . .”).
19. Part II.A, supra.
20. Part II.B, supra.
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developed into a commodity for which there is demand, produced,
and marketed. As with works of authorship, the cost of producing a
hard good has both fixed and marginal components. The fixed costs
include the costs of developing the product and investment in facilities that are used to produce it. Marginal costs are the additional
costs, such as for materials and labor inputs, that increase along
with the quantity manufactured. The total cost of producing an exemplar of a product consists of an allocated share of the fixed costs
plus the marginal cost associated with producing that exemplar.
A competitor of the original producer of an item can gain a competitive advantage if it is able to reduce the costs of its production below those experienced by the original producer. One way it may do
this is by lowering its fixed costs through appropriating information
that the original producer has, at some cost to itself, generated during the process of bringing the good to market. The information that
the competitor may profitably appropriate includes (1) the original
idea for the product; (2) the design of the product; (3) the fact that
there is consumer demand for the product, which may be acquired
through expenditures on surveys, focus group testing, and other
market research;21 and (4) the most effective channels of marketing
or distributing the product.22 In the absence of any right to prevent
appropriation, this information is a positive externality of the original producer’s productive activity.23
As with copyright, legal rules reserve some, but not all, of the
value of these externalities for the original producer. (1) The conception of the product may be protected, if at all, only by contract. The
person who conceives the idea may disclose it to another on terms
that contractually obligate the other not to make use of the idea in a
way that harms the interests of the conceiver. However, any such restriction cannot bind third parties, such as potential competitors who
learn of the product through observation of the marketplace. (2) The
21. Uncertainty about whether a particular product will succeed in the marketplace
gives rise to “selection bias.” See Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property Is Still Property, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 108, 115 (1990). “There will be hits and misses. The original designer bears the costs of both; the copier duplicates only the hits.” Id.
22. For a somewhat different categorization of the types of informational assets that a
competitor can appropriate from the original producer, see Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra
note 14, at 1586-88 (detailing the development process of reverse-engineered products).
23. Second comers may also benefit from the original producer’s efforts in ways that
do not involve the appropriation of information. For example, competitors can take advantage of the increase in market demand for the product that is created by the original producer’s marketing efforts. Consumers might not realize, for example, that they have a need
for Christmas-tree-shaped automobile air fresheners that dangle from the rearview mirror
until a pioneer producer disseminates marketing messages that prove this is so. Competitors can forgo the expenses needed to create this market demand. The original producer
may be able to internalize some of the value thus created through branding its product, invoking trademark law. However, branding is unlikely to succeed in excluding competitors
from an entire product category.
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design of the product may be obvious from the face of it or may require some effort to discover. Aspects of the design may enjoy legal
protection through laws protecting trade secrets or through patent
law. The efficacy of these legal protections is limited. Trade secret
protection may in principle last indefinitely, but will be unavailing if
the owner does not make reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy or
if the secret can be discovered by observation.24
With a few narrow exceptions,25 there is no legal right to prevent
competitors from reverse engineering ordinary goods to uncover their
design.26 Patent protection lasts no more than twenty years, after
which the right to make the product and the information regarding
how to make it and how best to use it (which is disclosed in the patent application) are freely appropriable. Moreover, many industrial
inventions and designs are not patentable or are not of sufficient
value to justify the expense of obtaining a patent. (3) The fact that
there is consumer demand for the product is hard to conceal once the
product is in the marketplace, though a producer may seek to limit
the amount of information available to potential competitors by not
releasing its sales figures. (4) The method of marketing or distributing the product might, but usually will not, be protectable by a business method patent.
Beyond these limited legal protections, original producers have
another powerful ally enabling them to recover their development
costs and make a profit despite the best efforts of imitative competitors, namely the first-mover advantage. Simply put, it takes second
comers a while to accomplish their copying. During that interval the
original producer is insulated from the negative effects of a competitor’s acquisition of competitively significant information at a lower
cost than the original producer had to pay.27
In view of these considerations, it is clear that the positiveexternality-generating (or public-good) aspect of creative authorship
is not unique but is only a particular manifestation of a characteristic applying to productive activity in general. Like a prospective author, the prospective original producer of an ordinary hard good is
assumed to engage in an ex ante calculation whether to invest in development and production of a product that takes into account
(among other considerations) the appropriability of competitively im24. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) & cmt. (1985).
25. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing legal prohibitions against
reverse engineering of boat hulls and semiconductor chip topographies).
26. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. (1985) (recognizing reverse engineering as
a proper means of uncovering a trade secret); Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 14, at
1582 (“Reverse engineering has always been a lawful way to acquire a trade secret . . . .”).
27. See J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms,
94 COLUM. L. REV. 2432, 2506-11 (1994).
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portant information by second comers. If the value that competitors
are able freely to appropriate is so significant that the original producer cannot hope to make a profit, then the would-be producer will
invest elsewhere.
Thus, both prospective authors and prospective producers of ordinary goods can, with some justification, claim that they require legal
prohibition against free appropriation of at least some of the intellectual spinoffs of their productive activities if they are to have an adequate economic incentive to engage in such activity. If there is a distinction to be made between these two cases, it is not in the existence
of appropriable effort, but rather in its extent. That is, in different
contexts there may be differences in the magnitude of the advantage vis-à-vis the original producer that a second comer can derive
from his appropriation of externalized benefits created by the
original producer. The next Section analyzes the determinants of
the magnitude and the significance to the original producer of this
appropriable value.
2. Comparative Appropriability
Since our goal is to ascertain the impact that externalization of
benefits has on authors’ and producers’ incentives to engage in creative and productive activities, we should view the situation from the
standpoint of the author/producer.
The producer’s enterprise will be a profitable one only if it can sell
its product for more than its average total cost of production, or ATC.
The ATC consists of the total cost of manufacturing a given quantity
of output, divided by that quantity. The total cost of manufacturing,
or TC, is the sum of two components: the total fixed cost, or FC, and
total variable cost, or VC. FC is the amount of the producer’s expenses (such as equipment, office rental, product development, and
so on) that do not vary with output. VC is the amount of the producer’s expenses that do vary with output (such as cost of materials,
labor costs, and so on).
What the second comer achieves by copying is a reduction in its
fixed costs. In the case of ordinary goods, the reduction might be in
expenses for market research and product development. In the case
of works of authorship, the savings come from eliminating the cost of
creating the work, which may consist either of the opportunity cost
(if the second comer would otherwise be the creator) or the actual
cost of acquiring the rights to a work (if the second comer would otherwise hire or commission another to create the work).
The second comer usually cannot appropriate all of the intellectual spinoffs of the original producer’s activity. For example, the expertise the original producer achieves through its development ef-
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forts is something that the second comer may not be able to acquire
through copying activities, as is the advantage of being first to market with the product. The proportion of the original producer’s fixed
costs that the second comer can appropriate will depend on the particular circumstances; more or less of the value generated by the
original producer’s productive activity may be locked up in a nonappropriable form.
The second comer’s advantage will be limited in another way too.
The enterprise of copying is usually not costless; the second comer
incurs certain expenses to accomplish the appropriation. For ordinary goods, this might include the expense of gathering information
about the efforts of other producers, assessing which products and
manufacturing techniques are most successful, and reverse engineering a product to determine how it is made. In the case of works of authorship, the costs of copying may be substantial (as with the cost of
copying a book by quill pen or the cost of duplicating a sculptural
form) or nearly costless (as with the cost of copying a digital file)—
but in any case, the costs of copying must be less than the cost of independently creating a competing work28 or the game would not be
worth the candle. Thus, to determine the advantage the second
comer gains with respect to the original producer we must subtract
the second comer’s copying expenses from the value of what has
been appropriated.
From the standpoint of competitive advantage, the relevant factor
is the percentage of the cost reduction, rather than its absolute
value.29 The percentage of the second comer’s savings is the amount
of its savings divided by the original producer’s costs. Putting together the above considerations into a single equation, we find that
the second comer’s comparative advantage is:

A  FCop  CEsc
FCop  VCop

,

where
A is the portion of the original producer’s fixed costs that the second comer is able to appropriate (0 < A < 1);
FCop is the original producer’s fixed costs;
CEsc is the second comer’s copying expenses; and

28. A competing work might be one that is identical to the original, if it is not protected by copyright, or one that prospective purchasers view as a close substitute, if it is.
29. A one-dollar cost reduction in producing a car that sells for $30,000 will give the
producer no significant comparative advantage. The same cost reduction on a two-dollar
item is significant enough to ruin the competition.
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VCop is the original producer’s variable costs for some given quantity of production.30
It follows that the second comer’s comparative advantage will depend on several factors. First, the greater the proportion of the original producer’s fixed costs that is appropriable (that is, the larger that
A is), the greater the second comer’s advantage. Second, the smaller
the variable costs in proportion to fixed costs (VCop/FCop), the greater
the second comer’s advantage. This ratio will depend both on the nature of the productive activity (some types of production are inherently more capital-intensive than others) and on the quantity of the
output (at higher levels of output fixed costs become of decreasing
significance). Third, the smaller the second comer’s copying expenses
(CEsc), the greater the second comer’s advantage.
By considering the comparative magnitudes of these factors in
connection with different sorts of productive activity, we can attempt to get some idea of the impact of free appropriability on the
incentives experienced by creative authors and by producers of ordinary goods.
(a) Appropriable Proportion of Fixed Costs
The value of A is likely to be higher in connection with many
products of intellectual activity than in connection with the production of ordinary goods. A second comer can potentially appropriate
nearly all of the effort the original producer expended in creating a
work of authorship as well as the knowledge that there is market
demand for it.31 The value of A will depend in part upon the medium
of expression. With some media, the second comer’s copy is nearly a
perfect substitute for the original. This is true of works in digital
formats: music on CD, movies on DVD, digitized text, and computer
programs. However, the copier may fail to appropriate ancillary aspects of the product’s value, such as its packaging or technical support from the manufacturer. With other media, the production values
are of greater significance to the value of the product. This is true, for
example, of hardcover books (more durable and easier to carry
around and read than a sheaf of 8½" x 11" photocopied pages) and
items such as sculpture and paintings that cannot be closely duplicated at an acceptable price.32
30. For the derivation of this expression, see Appendix A.
31. See J.H. Reichman, Computer Programs as Applied Scientific Know-How: Implications of Copyright Protection for Commercialized University Research, 42 VAND. L. REV.
639, 660 (1989) (observing that unlike traditional hard goods, an exemplar of a knowledgebased product (such as a computer program) “tends to bear its know-how on its face” and is
therefore more copiable).
32. Some intangible elements of the value of a work of authorship cannot be appropriated at all. The value of an original painting or a limited-edition print signed and num-
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In addition to the value lost by not being able to make a perfect
copy in some media, the second comer leaves behind the benefits accruing to the producer by reason of the creative effort. For an individual creator, this might consist of skills that will enable her to create a better song, book, or artwork the next time she sets out to do so.
For a collective endeavor, such as production of a movie or recording
of a symphony, the nonappropriable value might be the skill needed
to coordinate the creative efforts of a number of individuals.
With ordinary goods, a smaller proportion of the original producer’s effort will often be appropriable.33 As with works of authorship, the ordinary goods second comer appropriates the value of
knowing the market response to the product. However, access to an
exemplar of ordinary productive processes (a piece of furniture, a
steel beam, an electronic device, a bushel of corn) in most cases does
not enable the second comer to appropriate a high proportion of the
value of the fixed costs that went into creating it. Close study of a
steel beam may not reveal much about the process used to create it,
nor does it reduce at all the second comer’s expenses in acquiring and
operating a blast furnace, a rolling mill, or other equipment needed
to make the beam. Reverse engineering a product may or may not
reveal much about how the product is made. 34 That knowledge may
reduce the development expenses that go into the producer’s fixed
costs, but it does not eliminate them, and it does not obviate the need
to invest in machinery, land, or other capital resources that are required for production. Moreover, the second comer’s version is
unlikely to be as close a substitute for the original as in the case of
works of authorship, meaning that less of the value contributed by
the original producer’s fixed expenditures is appropriable.
It is quite possible for some components of the fixed costs associated with a particular product to be more appropriable than other
components. For example, a book publisher may incur expenses for
typesetting and editing a manuscript and for promoting the book.
The promotional expenses are fully appropriable, assuming the second comer is addressing the same market as the original publisher.
bered by the artist may derive in substantial measure from the artist’s personal involvement with the particular copy. This intangible value may be analogized to the branding
element of an ordinary good that carries a valuable trademark. An exact duplicate of a
Gucci bag, sans the “Gucci” imprint, is far less valuable than a true Gucci bag.
33. In the category of “ordinary goods” we should include works of authorship that are
in the public domain, unprotected by copyright. Consider a classic work of literature whose
copyright has expired. A publisher need not pay any royalties to the author, so the publisher’s fixed costs will consist of the cost of preparing the text for printing. This cost is no
more appropriable than is the expense of tooling up for production of any ordinary good.
34. Automobile manufacturers consider the knowledge gained from reverse engineering sufficiently valuable that they routinely slice up competitors’ products to learn the secrets of their design and composition. See Carl Hoffman, The Teardown Artists, WIRED, Feb.
2006, at 136, available at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/14.02/teardown_pr.html.
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Typesetting costs may be viewed as nonappropriable, if the second
comer finds it necessary to reset the type, or largely appropriable to
the extent that a photographic reproduction serves as a substitute.35
(b) Ratio of Fixed Costs to Variable Costs
It is difficult to generalize about the ratio of fixed to variable costs
as between works of authorship and ordinary goods. For some works
of authorship the variable costs are a relatively small fraction of the
total (or average) costs. A commercial movie studio may spend
tens of millions of dollars to produce and market a film and proportionately very little on duplicating the result on physical media. A second comer who is not constrained by copyright has an
enormous cost advantage.
In other situations, however, the cost structure might be just the
opposite. Consider an unknown rock-and-roll band that has just been
signed by a record label. The contract may provide that the label
pays very little to the band, and the costs of producing an album may
be low. The lion’s share of the label’s costs may be in manufacturing,
promotion, and distribution.36 At the other extreme, we might consider an unsigned musician who produces his own music in a home
studio and whose opportunity cost is very low. With small volumes of
sales and CDs sold to end purchasers rather than through distributors, the (variable) costs of manufacturing and selling the disks may
vastly exceed the fixed costs of creation. The creator in such a situation would have little to fear from second comers, regardless of the
existence of copyright.
Ordinary goods, likewise, fall along a spectrum with respect to the
ratio of fixed to variable costs. Fixed costs may be dominant, as in
the case of a product that requires expensive tooling but has low
costs for materials and production labor. At the other extreme, variable costs may dominate, as is the case with producing jewelry from
precious metals and gems or building tract housing.
In general, the ratio of fixed to variable costs will depend greatly
on the volume of units produced, because the more units are produced, the less the fixed costs per unit. Variable costs per unit may

35. For illustrations of the magnitudes of the various costs involved in book publishing,
see generally ALBERT N. GRECO, THE BOOK PUBLISHING INDUSTRY 163-69 (2d ed. 2005).
36. Promotional expenses may be quite high. According to one estimate, marketing,
promoting, and touring may cost a major record label between $140,000 and $350,000 for a
single album. See Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster
and the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 315 (2002) (citing
Jon Healey, CD Sticker Shock Accounting for Retail Sale Prices that Drive Song-Swapping
Sites, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Sept. 3, 2000, at 1D).
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also decrease with greater volume, to the extent that economies of
scale exist.
Thus, although it may be true more often than not that “the ratio
of fixed to marginal costs is much higher for information than for
other types of goods,”37 this is not invariably the case.
(c) Copying Expenses
For most types of works of authorship, we would expect the costs
of copying the content to be small in comparison with the costs of
creating the work; that is, CEsc is small compared to FCop. At the
limit, the cost of copying digitized materials may approach zero:
making a copy of a word-processing document, a music file in .mp3
format, a graphic in .jpg or .gif format, or a movie encoded with the
DVD-Video standard. Copying the design of an integrated circuit
chip, while costly, is far less expensive than designing the chip in the
first place.38 Copying nondigital works may cost more. For example,
making a high-quality lithographic reproduction of an artwork requires substantial skill and expense. In most contexts, however, it
would seem that the cost of copying would be substantially less than
the original producer’s cost of creation. In addition to the costs of actually making the copy, there may be costs for determining whether
an item is worth copying or locating and obtaining an original to
copy.
The cost of copying ordinary goods will vary dramatically depending on the nature of the item. Just as with works of authorship, what
the second comer needs to copy is intellectual in origin, namely information that enables the second comer to avoid bearing some of the
fixed costs borne by the original producer. Copying from competitors
may involve various techniques.39 Recommended methods include
performing chemical analyses and other tests on the competitor’s
products;40 disassembling, weighing, and labeling each component
part of a competitor’s product;41 taking a tour of the competitor’s

37. Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV.
1031, 1053 (2005) (emphasis omitted).
38. H.R. REP. NO. 98-781, at 2 (1984), 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5750, 5751 (“The development costs for a single new chip can reach $100 million. . . . A competing firm can photograph a chip and its layers, and in several months and for a cost of less than $50,000 duplicate the mask work of the innovating firm.”).
39. The science of figuring out what the competition is doing is called “competitive intelligence” or “industrial espionage,” depending on one’s point of view. See LARRY
KAHANER, COMPETITIVE INTELLIGENCE 16 (1996); TIMOTHY W. POWELL, ANALYZING YOUR
COMPETITION 18 (1993). There is even a professional society composed of those who engage
in the activity. See Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals, http://www.scip.org
(last visited July 3, 2007).
40. See TONY REID, LEGAL INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE 11 (1985).
41. See Hoffman, supra note 34.
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premises;42 looking through the competitor’s trash;43 focus-group testing the competitor’s products;44 and consulting public directories and
regulatory filings.45 This range of techniques implies a range of values of CEsc.
D. Conclusion
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the need for legal rules
designed to assure that authors will receive adequate economic rewards for their efforts and will therefore have an ex ante incentive to
engage in creative activity is but a special case of the more general
problem of enabling producers to capture some of the benefits of their
activity that, in the absence of legally enforceable rights, would be
lost as positive externalities. Producers of ordinary goods are enabled
to internalize some of the positive externalities of their efforts
through legal protection of trade secrets and patents, enforceability
of confidentiality agreements, and protectability of trademarks. Producers also enjoy various degrees of “natural” protection against
copying by second comers in the form of nonappropriability, high
costs of copying, the first-mover advantage, and low ratios of fixed to
variable costs. Copyright protection provides analogous benefits to
authors, allowing them to internalize some (but not all) of the positive externalities they generate.
Underlining the conclusion that creative authorship is, from the
standpoint of producer incentives, not fundamentally different from
any other productive activity is the fact that one form of intellectual
property protection, copyright, exists to promote the former, while
other types, patent and trade secrecy, promote the latter. In addition,
with creative authorship, what the second comer may profitably appropriate is not limited to the content of the copied item (words,
sounds, images) but, as with other types of productive activity, includes ancillary intellectual spinoffs such as the existence of a market for a particular item.
The model developed above identifies the factors that determine
how significantly the appropriability of the benefits generated by
productive activity affects the incentives of producers of both ordinary goods and works of authorship. We cannot say categorically that
appropriability is more of a problem for prospective authors than for
other prospective producers; that depends on the values of the parameters identified in the model.
42.
43.
44.
(1999).
45.

See RONALD L. MENDELL, THE QUIET THREAT 12-24 (2003).
See id. at 64.
See ALAN DUTKA, COMPETITIVE INTELLIGENCE FOR THE COMPETITIVE EDGE 52-54
See POWELL, supra note 39, at 85-161.
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III. USE OF TPMS CREATES NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES
Having observed that authors and other producers face analogous
difficulties due to the positive externalities resulting from their productive efforts, it is natural to inquire whether a corresponding analogy exists with respect to negative externalities.46 It is very common
for both productive and consumptive activities to have negative impacts on producers and consumers who have no ability to control
those activities. Polluting emissions from a factory may cause acid
rain that negatively affects the production of nearby farmers or smog
that harms the health of consumers. One person’s smoking may injure nonsmokers in the room.
As I have argued elsewhere, the use by publishers of TPMs to prevent unauthorized use of their copyrighted products imposes several
types of costs on society.47 My claim here is that some of these costs
are appropriately viewed as negative externalities.
A. The Social Costs of TPMs
The most widely implemented types of TPMs are encryption-based
technologies that either prevent users from making unauthorized
copies or limit the devices that may be used to access a particular
copy. A familiar example of the former is the Content Scramble System (CSS), which is implemented on commercially released movie
DVDs. CSS makes it impossible to copy such a movie without the use
of some technology that circumvents the TPM. An example of the latter type of protection is the tethering technology that prevents a user
from installing Windows XP on more than one computer or from
playing an .mp3 music file downloaded from iTunes on more than
five computers.48

46. Just as positive externalities are associated with public goods, so negative externalities are associated with public bads. A public bad is the converse of a public good: it is
an activity causing harm, rather than benefit, that is both nonrival and nonexcludable. See
Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV.
1285, 1297 n.42 (2003) (“The flip side of the public goods problem is the public ‘bads’ problem—often referred to as the tragedy of the commons—caused by the absence of pricing
mechanisms that enable cost internalization.”). A public bad exists “when a large number
of parties are affected negatively and simultaneously . . . by an action” and “[t]he nature of
the phenomenon is such that there is no low-cost way to insulate and partition the affected
individuals in the group from the negative effect.” Karol Boudreaux & Bruce Yandle, Public Bads and Public Nuisance: Common Law Remedies for Environmental Decline, 14
FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 55, 59-60 (2003).
47. See John A. Rothchild, Economic Analysis of Technological Protection Measures,
84 OR. L. REV. 489, 500-14 (2005).
48. For a discussion of TPMs designed to protect music, movies, and books, see Besek,
supra note 2, at 453-60.
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In 1998, Congress bolstered the use of TPMs by enacting rules
that make it illegal to circumvent TPMs.49 Simplified somewhat,
these anticircumvention rules prohibit three types of conduct. First,
the rules prohibit circumventing a TPM that controls access to a
copyrighted work.50 Second, they prohibit trafficking in such circumvention technology if the technology does not serve any significant
legitimate purpose.51 Third, they prohibit trafficking in a technology
that allows copying of a work protected by a TPM, again if the technology serves no legitimate purpose.52
The use of TPMs results in three types of harms affecting people
who are not participants in any transaction involving a TPMprotected copy of a copyrighted work—harms that are therefore
negative externalities.53
First, use of TPMs results in contraction of the public domain.54
The notional copyright “bargain” between authors and the public
stipulates that authors are granted legally enforceable exclusive
rights to exploit their creations in specified ways;55 however, it also
stipulates that these rights are subject to certain exceptions for the
benefit of the public56 and that the work is to become freely available
to all upon expiration of the work’s term of protection.57 The most
significant limitations on the author’s exclusive rights are (1) the author has no right to control fair use of the work58 and (2) the exclusive
rights protect only the author’s expression but not the underlying
ideas.59 TPMs that prevent the copying of even small portions of a
work interfere with the exercise of fair-use rights. TPMs that prevent
unauthorized access to the author’s protected expression also prevent
access to the author’s unprotected ideas. Access controls and tethering systems deny the public access to a work even after expiration of
the copyright term.60
49. The rules were enacted as part of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L.
No. 105-304, § 103, 112 Stat. 2860, 2863-76 (1998).
50. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2000).
51. Id. § 1201(a)(2).
52. Id. § 1201(b)(1).
53. These harms are discussed at greater length in Rothchild, supra note 47, at 500-14.
54. Id. at 501-04.
55. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
56. See Rothchild, supra note 47, at 499.
57. 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-04 (2000) (establishing duration of copyright protection).
58. Rothchild, supra note 47, at 499, 501-03.
59. Id. at 499, 503.
60. See Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems
for Access Control Technologies: Hearing Before the Copyright Office, Library of Congress,
Docket No. RM 2005-11 (2005) [hereinafter Section 1201 Rulemaking] (Comment of Jim
Konop, Copyright Office, Rulemaking on Exemptions from Prohibition on Circumvention of
Technological Measures that Control Access to Copyrighted Works (2006), available at
http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2006/comments/konop.pdf) (Section 1201 prevents copying
public-domain movies on DVD).
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Second, use of tethering technologies can reduce access to creative
works by eliminating the secondary market.61 The ready availability
of used books, records, movie DVDs, and music CDs allows those who
cannot afford the price of new items to purchase them used and allows purchasers of new items to reduce their effective cost by reselling them when they are no longer needed.62 In addition, libraries can
make these materials temporarily available at no cost to borrowers.
However, an item that is tethered to a particular user’s machine
cannot be lent by a library and cannot be sold to anybody else.63
Third, TPMs may be implemented in a manner that harms competition and innovation.64 Several manufacturers of ordinary consumer
items, including printer toner cartridges and garage door openers,
have attempted to stifle competitors by invoking the anticircumvention rules.65 Their argument is based on the fact that, like many consumer goods, these items incorporate electronic components that use
software code to control their operations.66 Competing products that
interface with these components must work around this code, giving
rise to claims that the competitors are engaging in unlawful circumvention. The courts have not been very receptive to these arguments
thus far, but under a new set of factual circumstances they might
have more traction.67 Use of TPMs may also interfere with innovation by making difficult or impossible certain types of encryption research and reverse engineering.68
B. TPMs and Externalities
These societal harms constitute negative externalities of the publishers’ use of TPMs. Consider the sale of a copy of a software application protected with a tethering restriction that prevents it from being used on any computer other than the one on which it is first
loaded. The presence of the TPM has effects not only on the consumer who purchased the software but also on third parties. For one
thing, the tethering restriction makes it impossible to sell the copy on
the secondary market (unless it is sold together with the computer on
61. Rothchild, supra note 47, at 504-05.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 507-13.
65. See, e.g., Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 529
(6th Cir. 2004) (involving computer chips in toner cartridges); Chamberlain Group, Inc. v.
Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1183 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (involving garage door openers).
66. See Zohar Efroni, A Momentary Lapse of Reason: Digital Copyright, the DMCA
and a Dose of Common Sense, 28 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 249, 295 (2005) (noting “the widespread use of consumer products that contain one or several computer programs responsible for the operation of products in which they are embedded”).
67. See Rothchild, supra note 47, at 513.
68. See Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 14, at 1647 (describing “the chilling effects of the DMCA on encryption and computer security research”).
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which it was originally installed).69 Since the tethering restriction
means that used copies of Windows XP are unavailable for purchase,
a person who buys a new PC cannot save money by equipping it with
a superseded but still serviceable copy of Windows XP obtained at a
garage sale. Furthermore, the tethering restriction amounts to a
permanent limitation on the usability of that copy, preventing access
to the work it contains even beyond expiration of the copyright. The
important point here is that the preference of impecunious computer
users for cheap used copies of software and the interest of society in
populating the public domain with usable copies are not factored into
the publisher’s decision whether to protect its products with TPMs or
into the purchaser’s decision of how much to pay for it. The publisher’s decision whether to implement TPMs is based solely on considerations of maximizing its profits. The full social costs of the decision to implement TPMs are not factored into the publisher’s cost
function.70 As a result, the publisher implements more TPMs than
would be socially optimal.
As another example, consider the societal effects of anticopy technologies. To the extent that a copyrighted work is distributed only in
formats that are copy-protected, fair-use copying is eliminated.71 Suppose, for example, that the major record labels began releasing their
recordings exclusively on CDs equipped with an anticopy TPM,72 as is
69. The features of a tethering TPM are determined by the individual publisher that
deploys it. For example, the tethering system accompanying Windows XP, which Microsoft
refers to as “product activation,” is designed so that it requires reactivation if the user replaces a certain number of components of her computer, and reactivation is permitted only
by Microsoft’s leave. See Microsoft, Windows XP Product Activation (2002),
http://www.microsoft.com/windowsxp/evaluation/features/activation.mspx (“If you overhaul
your computer by replacing a substantial number of hardware components, it may appear
to be a different PC. You may have to reactivate Windows XP.”). The End User License Agreement accompanying Windows XP explains that the user’s copy of the software can only be used on the computer with which the user obtained the software.
See, e.g., Microsoft Corporation, Microsoft Windows XP Home Edition (Retail) EndUser License Agreement for Microsoft Software (June 1, 2004), available at
http://www.microsoft.com/windowsxp/home/eula.mspx. Therefore, the product-activation
technology presumably prevents a copy of Windows XP from being used on a new computer
that the user buys.
70. Some of the social costs of a tethering restriction may be factored into the publisher’s implementation decision through a reduction in the price that purchasers are willing to pay: a purchaser should be willing to pay more for an untethered copy, which he expects to be able to resell on the secondary market, than for a tethered copy, which cannot
be resold. But there are other societal effects that are not brought home to the publisher.
For example, society may have an interest in widespread availability of products of creative authorship among those who cannot afford to pay the full price, an interest not shared
by publishers or purchasers.
71. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) (fair use). Fair-use copying might be permissible for
personal noncommercial use, to enable performances permitted under 17 U.S.C. § 110(1)
(2000) (exemption of certain performances and displays), or for a variety of other purposes.
See id. §§ 107-22.
72. The four major labels control about 72% of the recorded music market. See Paul
Williams, EMI Ponders Next Move, MUSIC WEEK, May 13, 2006, at 1 (2004 figures). The
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currently the case with movies on DVDs.73 No fair-use copying of
popular music would then be possible. For some purposes, copying
would still be possible by exploiting the “analog hole”: playing the CD
on one machine and making a recording of the output using a microphone attached to an audio cassette recorder, a video camcorder, or a
microphone plugged into a computer. But such workarounds will not
always be available. The result would be an impoverished version of
fair use,74 a circumstance that has prompted calls for an exception to
the anticircumvention rules to allow such copying.75 However, society’s losses resulting from the impoverishment of fair use are of no
concern to the publisher, and such costs do not factor into its decision
whether to implement the TPM.
Consider a third scenario. Suppose that manufacturers of ordinary consumer goods containing electronic components succeed in
avoiding the holdings of two high-profile cases76 that disapproved of
the invocation of the anticircumvention rules in a manner that could
interfere with competition, either by redesigning their products77 or
labels are experimenting with anticopy TPMs. In 2005, Sony BMG released large quantities of CDs equipped with anticopy technology, leading to a debacle when it was revealed
that playing the disks in a computer’s CD drive resulted in undisclosed modifications to
the computer that introduced a serious security hole. See Robert McMillan, Settlement
Ends Sony Rootkit Case, INFOWORLD DAILY NEWS, May 23, 2006, available at
http://www.infoworld.com/article/06/05/23/78581_HNsonyrootkitsettlement_1.html. EMI is
testing a different anticopy technology, while Warner and Universal are still on the sidelines. See Brian Garrity & Susan Butler, Copy Protection’s Future Unclear, BILLBOARD,
Jan. 14, 2006. It remains to be seen whether the major labels will push ahead with implementation of TPMs throughout their product lines.
73. Anticopy technology called the Content Scramble System is currently widely employed on commercially released movies on DVD, making it impossible to engage in fairuse copying of DVDs without specialized hardware or software. The best-known provider of
such software went out of business after battling the movie industry in court. See 321 Studios v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (N.D. Cal. 2004); Paramount Pictures Corp. v. 321 Studios, No. 03-CV-8970, 2004 WL 402756 (S.D.N.Y. 2004);
321 Studios Ends Operations, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2004, at C6.
74. See R. Anthony Reese, Will Merging Access Controls and Rights Controls Undermine the Structure of Anticircumvention Law?, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 619, 653 (2003).
75. In Section 1201 Rulemaking, supra note 60, several commenters proposed an exception that would allow fair-use copying of portions of movie DVDs and music CDs. See
Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies: Hearing Before the Copyright Office, Library of Congress, Docket No. RM
2005-11 (2005) (Comments of the Library Copyright Alliance and the Music Library Association; Comments of Peter Decherney, Assistant Professor at the University of Pennsylvania’s Cinema Studies Program; Michael Delli Carpini, Professor and Annenberg
Dean; and Katherine Sender, Assistant Professor at the University of Pennsylvania’s
Annenberg School of Communication; and Comment of Jeff Fessler), available at
http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2006/comments/decherney_upenn.pdf.
76. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir.
2004); Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
77. In Lexmark, a manufacturer of printer toner cartridges containing a chip designed
to prevent its printers from accepting cartridges made by competing manufacturers argued
that a supplier of cloned chips was trafficking in devices that allowed access to copyrighted
software code in the printer. 387 F.3d at 529. The court denied the claim on the ground
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by contractually limiting their customers’ rights to use their products
in connection with products made by third parties.78 As other commentators have noted, neither case rules out the possibility that the
anticircumvention rules might be used to stifle competition.79 If the
rules were so interpreted, manufacturers could broadly eliminate
competition from aftermarket manufacturers.80 The harm to society
that would result from this dearth of competition would not be factored into the manufacturers’ decisions whether to implement the
TPMs—quite the contrary.
that the code in the printer was freely accessible to anyone in possession of the printer, so
that the chip did not really serve as an access control. See id. at 546. A manufacturer
might be able to avoid this outcome simply by encrypting the code in the printer.
78. In Chamberlain, the manufacturer of a garage door opener system charged that
compatible remote controls manufactured by a competitor were devices that circumvented
a frequently changed code designed to control access to a computer program that activated
the garage door opener motor. 381 F.3d at 1183. The court denied the claim, based on a
narrow reading of the anticircumvention provisions, according to which there could be no
actionable trafficking in the absence of an act that circumvents an access control. Id. at
1203-04. The court held that circumvention would occur only if the access was without the
copyright owner’s authorization—a circumstance not present under the facts of the case
because consumers who owned the garage door openers were authorized to engage in access of the computer program as necessary to operate the opener. Id.; see also Storage
Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng’g & Consulting, Inc., 421 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (discussing Chamberlain). A manufacturer might avoid this outcome by selling its
products subject to a contractual restriction against using an unauthorized device to access
code contained within its products. See Jacqueline Lipton, The Law of Unintended Consequences: The Digital Millennium Copyright Act and Interoperability, 62 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 487, 513 (2005). The Chamberlain court expressly declined to decide this point. 381
F.3d. at 1202 n.17. However, in other contexts courts have been willing to enforce contractual limitations of statutory user rights. See Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 639
(8th Cir. 2005) (contractual waiver of reverse engineering right); Bowers v. Baystate
Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1325-26 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (same).
79. See Dan L. Burk, Legal and Technical Standards in Digital Rights Management
Technology, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 537, 567 (2005) (“It remains unclear how robust these
particular results will be.”); Marcus Howell, Note, The Misapplication of the DMCA to the
Aftermarket, 11 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 128, 145 (2005) (“Although both circuit courts have
ruled in favor of the aftermarket manufacturer, neither case conclusively holds that aftermarket manufacturers are free from DMCA liability.”). Some commenters have likewise
noted threats to competition posed by the anticircumvention rules. See Section 1201
Rulemaking, supra note 58 (Comment of Jonathan R. Newman and Robert Pinkerton,
available at http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2006/comments/granick_wirelessalliance.pdf)
(mobile telephone manufacturers invoking Section 1201 to prevent use of their phones on
competing networks).
80. It has been noted that this could lead to a world in which car repairs could be accomplished only by buying replacement parts from the original equipment manufacturer,
with lower-priced aftermarket suppliers put out of business. See Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 552
(Merritt, J., concurring) (“If we were to adopt Lexmark’s reading of the statute, manufacturers could potentially create monopolies for replacement parts simply by using similar,
but more creative, lock-out codes. Automobile manufacturers, for example, could control
the entire market of replacement parts for their vehicles by including lock-out chips.”);
Daniel C. Higgs, Note, Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc. &
Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Technologies, Inc.: The DMCA and Durable Goods Aftermarkets, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 59, 77 (2004); Lance C. McCardle, Comment, Despite
Congress’s Good Intentions, the DMCA’s Anti-Circumvention Provisions Produce a Bad Result—A Means to Create Monopolies, 50 LOY. L. REV. 997, 1021 (2004).
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IV. REGULATORY RESPONSE TO EXTERNALITIES
The discussion in Part II showed that the process of creative authorship gives rise to positive externalities: benefits that, in the absence of any legal rules preventing it, may be appropriated by third
parties without the creator’s authorization. This appropriability was
seen to be a special case of a more general phenomenon, in which all
kinds of productive activity yield benefits that may be appropriated
by third parties. The result of this uncompensated appropriation of
value may be an undersupply of productive efforts, including both
creative authorship and production of ordinary goods, since producers are not rewarded with the full social value that flows from their
efforts. The law responds with assignments of rights (copyright, patents, trade secrecy, trademark) that allow the producer to limit—to
an extent that is determined by public policy—the appropriability of
the value created by its efforts.
The discussion in Part III showed that publishers’ use of TPMs
gives rise to negative externalities: societal harms that, in the absence of any legal rules to the contrary, are not factored into the publisher’s decision whether to implement TPMs. The result is an oversupply of TPMs, since the publishers are insulated from the full social costs of this choice of productive technique.
Just as appropriability of the fruits of creative authorship was
seen to be an aspect of the more general phenomenon of appropriability of the spinoffs of productive activity, so too externalization of
costs through use of TPMs may be viewed as an aspect of the more
general problem of externalization of the costs of productive activity.
The paradigmatic externalization of costs of production is pollution.
A factory releases pollutants into the air, which harms the health of
individuals living downwind or releases pollutants into a lake and
reduces the catch of fishermen. The company that owns the factory
does not experience the harms to health or fishing yields and so does
not factor the costs of those harms into its decision whether to implement less polluting, but more expensive, production methods. As a
result, the factory owner decides to pollute, even if the pollution could
be eliminated at a cost less than the value of the harms that the pollution causes. The decision to pollute is economically inefficient.
An analogy may thus be drawn between a publisher’s use of TPMs
and a manufacturer’s use of polluting manufacturing technologies.
Both are activities that impose costs upon third parties, which the
profit-maximizing producer will be disinclined to factor into its choice
of productive methods. It follows that, for the same reasons that
regulators have established rules and incentives aimed at reducing
producers’ output of pollution, regulators should intervene to reduce
publishers’ output of TPMs.
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Note that the goal of regulatory intervention is not to eliminate
the activity that gives rise to negative externalities but only to reduce that activity to the efficient level. Thus, the goal of environmental policy is not to eliminate all polluting activities—which could
only be done by banning automobiles, ending the production of electricity, and generally calling all industrial activity to a halt; the goal
is rather to cause polluters to invest in pollution controls up to the
point where additional controls would yield no net societal benefit. In
the same way, my proposal does not aim at eliminating use of TPMs,
but only at reducing use of TPMs to the efficient level.
In considering possible regulatory responses to the inefficient
overuse of TPMs, we may seek guidance from the types of regulatory
efforts that have been made to prevent inefficient overproduction of
pollution. The advantages and disadvantages of each of these approaches, as applied to internalize the social costs of TPMs, are canvassed in the following.
A. Traditional Command and Control
Following the traditional command-and-control approach, the
government would determine the optimal deployment of TPMs by
each publisher with respect to each product and would require publishers to abide by those limitations or face the threat of legal sanction. The regulator’s goal is to minimize the sum of the harms caused
by productive activity and the costs of preventing those harms.81 This
can be accomplished by compelling the producer to introduce preventative measures just up to the point where the gains to society from
the prevention equal the costs to the producer of engaging in prevention.82 Both overinvestment and underinvestment in prevention are
deviations from optimality: the former by resulting in outlays for
prevention that are not justified by their benefits, the latter by
continuing to produce externalized harms that could have been
prevented at a cost lower than that experienced by the victims of
the harms.
In the case of pollution, prevention costs consist of expenditures
the producer must incur to eliminate the external harms caused by
its pollution (or some portion of them) while maintaining the same
level of productive output.83 By analogy, the “output” attributable to
81. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An
Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713, 724 (1996) (“[W]e take the social goal to be the
minimization of the sum of harm and prevention costs.”).
82. See HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS 578 (5th ed. 1999).
83. Alternatively, the producer might choose to reduce pollution by reducing its level
of productive activity, if doing so would be less costly (taking into account the forgone profits on forgone production) than maintaining the same level of production while installing
pollution controls.

1206

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:1181

TPMs is a reduction in unauthorized use of the work of authorship
that the TPM protects. Thus, prevention costs for publishers consist
of what it would cost publishers to maintain the limits on unauthorized use brought about by TPMs, using alternative methods
that do not result in externalized harms.84 Such alternative methods might include, for example, an aggressive program of enforcement of copyrights.85
Formulation of rules about TPM usage thus requires that the government regulator have information about both the magnitude of the
externalized harms resulting from deployment of TPMs and the costs
that publishers would incur to prevent unauthorized use through
other means. Both of these types of information are likely to be difficult and expensive for the regulator to obtain. We might expect that
publishers, which have a strong incentive to discover and implement
the most cost-effective methods for preventing unauthorized uses of
their products, would have better information as to their own costs
than is readily available to regulators.86 If that is the case, then a
purely regulatory approach in effect wastes informational resources.87 In addition, the administrative cost of determining the
right level of TPMs would be very large, and this must be accounted
for as a component of the cost of prevention.
Accordingly, the regulator should consider approaches that incorporate market mechanisms to take maximum advantage of information in the hands of private parties.
84. The relevant cost here is the increased cost to the publisher of using alternative
methods rather than TPMs, since deployment of TPMs is not costless. We can presume
that the alternative methods cost more for a given effect; otherwise publishers would be using them in favor of TPMs.
85. In 2003, the trade association of the record labels, the Recording Industry Association of America, launched such a litigation strategy against those who share .mp3 music
files without the labels’ authorization. As of March 2007, the industry had sued about
18,000 individuals. See Hiawatha Bray, Record Firms Crack Down on Campuses, BOSTON
GLOBE, Mar. 8, 2007, at D1. Another approach is to place contractual restrictions on uses
that may be made of copyrighted materials. Some courts have upheld such contractual restrictions against a challenge that they are preempted by the Copyright Act. See, e.g.,
Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 459 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that Copyright
Act did not preempt contract); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1453, 1455 (7th
Cir. 1996) (same); eScholar, LLC v. Otis Educ. Sys., Inc., 387 F.Supp.2d 329, 331-33
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (same). Depending on their content, such restrictions might or might not
entail negative externalities.
86. For the plausibility of that assumption in the general case, see Kaplow & Shavell,
supra note 81, at 725 n.36 (assuming that injurers know their prevention costs better than
the state).
87. See Eric Kades, Preserving a Precious Resource: Rationalizing the Use of Antibiotics, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 611, 637 (2005); Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 81, at 725-27. In view
of the value of harnessing the informational resources of private parties, what accounts for
the continued existence of command-and-control regulation? One possibility is that incentives-based approaches may involve monitoring costs that outweigh their informational
advantages. See Kenneth R. Richards, Framing Environmental Policy Instrument Choice,
10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 221, 256-59 (2000).
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B. Coasean Bargaining
The most market-oriented regulatory response is for the regulator
to refrain from any direct regulation, aiming instead to create conditions that make it easier for private parties to negotiate efficient outcomes. This approach derives from the well-known Coase Theorem,
which states that, under a certain set of idealized conditions, bargaining among affected parties will bring about the efficient level of
production of externalities, regardless of the distribution of property
rights.88 In the pollution example, if the factory owner has an absolute legal right to pollute, downwind residents will bargain with the
owner and pay it a sum of money to implement the efficient level of
pollution control—that is, the level such that the cost of reducing pollution further would exceed the benefits to the residents. If, on the
other hand, the residents have an absolute right to clean air, the factory owner will pay them a sum of money for permission to engage in
that same, efficient level of pollution.89
Coasean bargaining may be effective when there are only a few interested parties, the parties have good information about the relevant costs and benefits, and the costs of bargaining are low, but these
conditions are absent from most real-world situations. In the case of
the factory creating air pollution, there are many parties involved
(everyone living downwind from the factory), which gives rise to a
collective action problem in which individuals have an incentive to
avoid paying their fair share of the pollution-reduction costs.90 It is
costly to engage in negotiations involving so many participants. Furthermore, it is difficult for any individual to calculate the monetary
value of the harm he experiences due to the pollution.
For similar reasons, we cannot count on Coasean bargaining to
reduce the implementation of TPMs to an efficient level. Those who
experience the externalized harms of TPMs are numerous and scattered. They include people whose fair-use access to copyrighted
works is impaired and those who are deprived of the benefits of a
secondary market in copies of goods in digital formats. They may include anyone who experiences higher costs for consumer goods or reduced selection due to anticompetitive applications of TPMs. Bargaining involving so many individuals, as well as a multiplicity of
publishers, would be prohibitively expensive. It would also be impossible for individuals to engage in rational bargaining, since few could
place a monetary value on the detriments they experience from the
use of TPMs in third-party transactions. Furthermore, many of those
88. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
89. For discussion of the idea of an efficient level of pollution, see VARIAN, supra note
82, at 576-78.
90. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).
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harmed by TPMs are not presently available to engage in bargaining: they belong to future generations that may experience the
detriments of a contracted public domain and reduced innovation
and competition. 91
This conclusion, that Coasean bargaining is not likely to be effective in bringing about an efficient level of production of negative externalities through implementation of technological protection measures, is paralleled by the unquestioned premise that such bargaining
will not yield the efficient level of authors’ capture of the positive externalities of their creative efforts. If Coasean bargaining were feasible in this context, there would be no need for copyright, patent, or
trade secret protection.
Book authors, for example, could be expected to bargain with their
(prospective) readers to obtain compensation sufficient to motivate
their authorial efforts. An author could offer a prospectus for a new
book on the open market and invite interested members of the public
to pay him money in an amount representing the utility that each
expects to enjoy from reading the book. In determining how much to
contribute, each member of the public would need to take into account
not only the expected value of the book to him personally but also the
present value to him of the book’s availability to his children and later
descendants, who are unable to enter subscriptions themselves.
If the author received enough such contributions to make it worth
his while to write the book, then he would do so. If not, then he would
not write the book and could either keep the money92 or return it to
the subscribers, as he calculated would best promote his interests.93
With either outcome, the result is efficient. If the book is written,
that indicates that the social benefit from writing the book exceeds
the author’s opportunity cost. If the book is not written, that is because society values the author’s services more highly if directed to
some activity other than writing the book. Copyright protection
would be superfluous.94
91. Eric Kades notes an analogous intertemporal externality in the context of overuse
of antibiotics, resulting in accelerated bacterial resistance and less effective medication in
the future. See Kades, supra note 87, at 627 (“[T]he very use of antibiotics imposes an external cost on later potential consumers.”).
92. There would be no unfairness in this, since after all the subscribers were contributing amounts based on the possibility that a book would be written, and they got what
they paid for, in the same sense that purchasers of losing lottery tickets paid for the possibility of winning a large sum of money.
93. He might choose to return the money if he thought that doing so would increase
the total quantity of subscriptions to his next proposed book by an amount exceeding what
he could have retained from the first subscription.
94. Bestselling author Stephen King tried something similar a few years ago. King
began releasing chapters of a new novel, called The Plant, in monthly installments, for
download from the Web according to an honor system: those who downloaded were asked
to pay King a dollar for each chapter. David D. Kirkpatrick, A Stephen King Online Horror
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In the same way, a prospective inventor could offer the public the
opportunity to subscribe to his inventive efforts. Inventions that society valued highly enough would get invented, and others would not.
There would be no need for patents, eliminating a significant claim
on society’s resources.95
With trade secret protection the bidding would go in the other direction. Yum! Brands, Inc. would pay each member of the public
whatever he required to refrain from making competitive use of the
recipe for the eleven herbs and spices that distinguish Kentucky
Fried Chicken from its imitators. If the total price was too high for
Yum to stomach, that would simply mean that secrecy of the recipe is
worth less to Yum than its free dissemination is worth to the public.
Yum’s profits would drop, but fried chicken lovers would gain in an
amount that more than compensates.
The Coasean bargaining hypothesized in the preceding paragraphs is unlikely to come about. The transaction costs entailed by
all that bargaining would swamp the subscriptions that could result
from it. Individuals in the copyright and patent scenarios would be
tempted to free ride: each would reason that if he withheld his own
contribution the book would still get written, so nobody would contribute.96 In the trade secret scenario there would be the problem of
holdouts: many individuals would want to charge the trade secret
owner a high price, reasoning that their own agreement was essential to the continued value of the secret, with the result that the total
demanded would outstrip the secret’s value.
Widespread recognition of the limits of Coasean bargaining in this
context has resulted in government intervention in the market in the
form of copyright, patent, and trade secret protection. For the same
reasons, we should not expect Coasean bargaining to bring about the
efficient level of TPM use by publishers.
C. Pigouvian Taxes
Another widely implemented approach to correcting production
externalities is to impose a tax on the producer that is calibrated to
give the producer an incentive to reduce to an efficient level the
Tale Turns into a Mini-Disaster, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2000, at C1. King declared that he
would keep writing and releasing chapters as long as at least 75% of downloaders paid the
dollar. Id. By the fifth installment, only 46% of downloaders paid the fee. Id. Accordingly,
as promised, King put the project on hold. See id.
95. Mark Lemley estimates that the processing of patent applications in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office costs more than $4 billion annually. Mark A. Lemley, Rational
Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1499 (2001).
96. The failure of Stephen King’s serialized, downloadable novel, supra note 94, might
perhaps be attributable to free ridership. King is after all one of the most successful novelists of recent decades, and The Plant might have been a success if copyright and excludability had been available to prevent free ridership.

1210

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:1181

quantity of social costs resulting from its activity.97 This approach,
which relies on marketplace incentives to a greater extent than does
straightforward regulation but to a lesser extent than does Coasean
bargaining, is sometimes called a Pigouvian tax, after the economist
Arthur Pigou, who first proposed it.98 An unregulated producer will
rationally set its pollution emissions at a level such that the marginal benefit from increasing pollution emissions is zero.99 Because
the producer does not take account of the harms that its pollution
causes to others, the level of pollution emitted will be higher than the
socially optimal level. When a tax per unit of pollution is applied, the
producer’s net marginal gain from increasing pollution emissions will
be reduced by the amount of the tax at any given level of production;
conversely, the cost to the producer of controlling emissions will be
reduced by the amount of tax that the producer saves for the pollution that is abated. If the tax is set at the correct level, the rational
producer will choose to emit pollution100 at the socially optimal
level.101
The same approach may be applied to induce publishers to reduce
their implementation of TPMs to the socially optimal level. Since
publishers are not currently required to take any cognizance of the
harms that their use of TPMs imposes on third parties, they produce
more than the socially optimal level of TPMs. A tax at the appropriate level would motivate publishers to reduce their output of TPMs to
the socially optimal quantity. As with the example of pollution, the
goal is not to eliminate the use of TPMs; doing so would be inefficient, since by hypothesis a reduction below the socially optimal
level harms the publisher more than it benefits society. The goal is
rather to minimize the sum of the cost of replacing TPMs with
methods that do not create negative externalities and the externalized harms that remain.102

97. Examples of such taxes in the context of pollution control include those on ozonedepleting chemicals, 26 U.S.C. §§ 4681-82 (2000), and gas-guzzling vehicles, 26 U.S.C.
§ 4064 (2000). See Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Shaping Code, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
319, 344 n.127 (2005). For a skeptical assessment of the use of taxes to affect producer and
consumer behavior, see generally Eric M. Zolt, Deterrence Via Taxation: A Critical Analysis
of Tax Penalty Provisions, 37 UCLA L. REV. 343 (1989).
98. See ARTHUR PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (4th ed. 1962).
99. The premise of this approach is that at some level of pollution emissions, the marginal benefit to the producer of increasing emissions begins to decrease monotonically.
That is, switching to production methods that result in the creation of more pollution
yields continually lesser benefits, until at some point there is no more net benefit to be
gained by increasing pollution. See VARIAN, supra note 82, at 578.
100. Pigouvian taxes have been proposed as a response to externalities in other contexts not involving pollution. See Kades, supra note 87, at 638-39 (proposing tax to control
overuse of antibiotics).
101. For a graphical illustration of the theory underlying Pigouvian taxes, see Appendix B.
102. See VARIAN, supra note 82.
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A TPM tax has the advantage of taking account of the different
costs for alternatives faced by different publishers. With commandand-control, each publisher must reduce its TPM usage to the level
specified by the regulator, regardless of its costs in doing so. With a
TPM tax, publishers facing higher alternative costs (for example,
those that experience unauthorized use by a large number of small
users, making litigation more expensive than it is for publishers that
are faced with a smaller number of large users) will find it economically advantageous to engage in relatively little TPM reduction,
while those facing lower alternative costs will engage in more TPM
reduction.103 If the TPM tax is set at the proper level, the result is the
same overall reduction in TPMs at a lower total cost to society.104
The principal difficulty with this approach is that the regulator is
likely to lack accurate information about the externalized harm resulting from TPMs. However, modifying incentives through taxation
has an advantage over command-and-control regulation in that it at
least harnesses the producer’s presumptively better information
about its own costs: it is the publisher, not the regulator, that decides
what level of TPMs to implement, taking into account the TPM tax
and the costs of alternatives to TPMs.105
Moreover, uncertainty about empirical inputs is endemic to all
forms of regulation, including existing applications of Pigouvian
taxes.106 The “gas guzzler” tax is an example of an effort by Congress
to modify producer and consumer behavior through Pigouvian taxes
that is based on impressionistic rather than rigorously empirical inputs.107 As enacted in 1978, the provision imposed a set of excise
taxes on manufacturers of automobiles that fall below specified fuel
economy standards.108 For model years 1986 and later,109 the tax was
zero for cars with a fuel economy of at least 22.5 miles per gallon, rising in steps to $3,850 for each car produced that was rated at less
than 12.5 mpg.110 The legislative history of the provision does not dis103. The larger the range of avoidance costs among different firms, the larger the potential efficiency gain from an incentive-based as compared to a command-and-control approach. See Richards, supra note 87, at 255-56.
104. See JOHN M. LEVY, ESSENTIAL MICROECONOMICS FOR PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS
180-81 (1995).
105. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
106. See LEVY, supra note 104, at 180-81.
107. See Energy Tax Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-618, §201, 92 Stat. 3174 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
108. Id.
109. Different sets of rates applied to model years 1980-85. Id. § 201(a).
110. The full table of taxes was as follows:
At least 22.5
$0
At least 21.5 but less than 22.5
500
At least 20.5 but less than 21.5
650
At least 19.5 but less than 20.5
850
At least 18.5 but less than 19.5
1,050
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close any econometric justification for the setting of these tax rates;
that is, there is no stated empirical basis from which to conclude that
that the selected tax rates will depress demand for low-fuel-economy
cars to the “correct” level.111 Given the scientific uncertainties concerning the harms resulting from increased consumption of gasoline
and the difficulty in monetizing harms such as increased vulnerability of the economy to foreign supply interruptions, we could hardly
expect a purely analytical approach to setting the excise tax level.
Underlining the empirical uncertainty is the fact that in the 1990
amendment of the “gas guzzler” tax, Congress simply doubled each of
the 1978 tax amounts.112 Like the establishment of the original set of
tax levels in 1978, the doubling of the tax schedule in 1990 reflected
a political judgment based on impressionistic factors rather than
hard-edged econometrics.
An analogous lack of empirical grounding underlies Congress’s
calibration of the level of legal protection applying to creative authorship. A truly scientific regime of intellectual property protection
would be based on empirical determinations of the value resulting
from creative authorship that is appropriable by third parties and
would be calibrated to allow that value (but no more) to be retained
by the authors. But the life of intellectual property protection has not
been logic: it has been experience.113 The empirical data needed for
such a scientific approach have never been assembled and probably
never could be.114 Legal protection of copyrights and patents sprang

At least 17.5 but less than 18.5
At least 16.5 but less than 17.5
At least 15.5 but less than 16.5
At least 14.5 but less than 15.5
At least 13.5 but less than 14.5
At least 12.5 but less than 13.5
Less than 12.5

1,300
1,500
1,850
2,250
2,700
3,200
3,850

Id.
111. From an economic standpoint, the correct levels of excise taxes are those which internalize all of the incremental external harms (such as harm to the environment in the
form of increased air pollution, global warming, and oil spills; harm to future generations
through depletion of nonrenewable fossil fuels; and additional military expenditures
needed to insure a supply of foreign oil) resulting from use of low-fuel-economy cars. As is
always the case, both underdeterrence and overdeterrence of an activity that has both
beneficial and harmful consequences results in an overall loss to society.
112. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1338,
§ 11216(a).
113. This of course paraphrases the famous Holmesian epigram. OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881) (“The life of the law has not been logic; it has
been experience.”).
114. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L.
REV. 531, 563 (2005) (“[I]t is difficult to imagine empirical studies that would accurately
identify the precise tradeoff necessary to achieve the optimal level of property protection.”);
Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 369
(1996) (“[I]t is difficult, if not impossible, to determine with any degree of precision the
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from a conviction that works of authorship and inventions would be
underproduced if authors and inventors were not enabled to capture
some of the value they created that would otherwise be freely appropriable,115 but the drafters of the Statute of Anne,116 the Venetian
Law of 1474,117 the federal patent118 and copyright119 statutes in the
1790s, and their successor enactments did not rely upon econometric
modeling to determine the correct level of protection. Levels of protection have instead been set through the interplay of political forces.
The same is true of the levies on recording equipment and blank
media established by the Audio Home Recording Act (AHRA).120 The
levies, amounting to two percent of the price of recording equipment
and three percent of the price of blank media,121 are paid by manufacturers and importers into a fund that is distributed to musicians,
songwriters, performers, and others involved in making musical recordings.122 The rationale for the levy system is that it compensates
the recipients for the loss of income that presumptively results from
the use of digital audio recording devices to make unauthorized copies of musical recordings.123 Consistent with this rationale, the royalty rates should be set at a level that generates a sum equivalent to
the music industry’s lost income.

term of copyright that would lead to optimum support for creative autonomy, while still allowing for sufficient user access.”).
115. Providing incentives to create has always been the dominant justification for
copyright and patent protection in Anglo-American law, as is evident from the wording of
the Intellectual Property Clause itself: “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts
. . . .” U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. A moral-rights basis for copyright coexists with the instrumentalist rationale, see William Patry, The Failure of the American Copyright System:
Protecting the Idle Rich, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 907, 911 (1997), but has never been the
driving force behind copyright legislation. See Irah Donner, The Copyright Clause of the
U.S. Constitution: Why Did the Framers Include It with Unanimous Approval?, 36 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 361, 369-73 (1992) (discussing the motivation behind the enactment of state
copyright laws in the 1780s).
116. Statute of Anne, 8 Ann., c. 19, 8 (1710) (Eng.).
117. The Venetian Law of 1474, generally regarded as the first patent law, is discussed
in Peter K. Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents in the International Intellectual Property Regime, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 323, 330-32 (2005).
118. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318.
119. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
120. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-10 (2000).
121. The devices and media within the scope of the levy are defined, roughly speaking,
to include those devices that are designed primarily for use by individuals in making digital copies of musical recordings. Id. §§ 1001(3), -(4)(A) (definitions of “digital audio recording device” and “digital audio recording medium”). The immediate target of the levy
system was digital audio tape technology, which at the time of enactment of the AHRA was
just beginning to enter the market.
122. Id. § 1004 (stating royalty payment rates); id. § 1006 (allocating royalty payments
among several classes of recipients).
123. H.R. REP. NO. 102-780, pt. 1, at 56 (1992) (“Enactment . . . will ensure that all affected rights owners and beneficiaries will be compensated for the copying of their works
on digital audio recording media . . . .”).
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But the data needed to derive this sum would be difficult or impossible to obtain. It would require determining how much unauthorized copying of recorded music occurs in private homes and how
much of that copying would have been converted into purchases of
commercial recordings if the recording technology had been unavailable. A Senate report refers to “[n]umerous reports” that “seek to
quantify the exact effect home taping has upon the music industry.”124 The reports that it mentions, however, state only broad estimates as to the extent of unauthorized taping and do not provide any
basis for determining the level of the music industry’s lost income.
In fact, the royalty rates that are included in the statute derive
not from any econometric study but from an agreement between representatives of the music industry and representatives of the consumer electronics industry. In 1990, songwriters and music publishers filed a lawsuit against Sony Corp., a manufacturer of DAT recorders, claiming that provision of the devices would constitute contributory copyright infringement.125 A year later the parties arrived
at a settlement, embodying a compromise agreement that “was incorporated into a legislative proposal and introduced in the Senate
and the House.”126 Included within that compromise was a schedule
of royalty rates, which is identical to the rates as enacted.127
Thus, the AHRA royalty rates were set by political compromise, as
was the case with the gas-guzzler tax and as has always been the
case in setting the level of protection provided by intellectual property laws.128 The same procedure can be used to set the level of the
TPM tax. It is unlikely that such a procedure will arrive at a tax that
results in the optimal deployment of TPMs, but then neither does the
current level of the tax—zero—yield that result.

124. S. REP. NO. 102-294, at 34 (1992).
125. See Gary S. Lutzker, Note, DAT’s All Folks: Cahn v. Sony and the Audio Home
Recording Act of 1991—Merrie Melodies or Looney Tunes?, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
145, 164-70 (1992) (discussing Cahn v. Sony Corp., No. 90 Civ. 4537 (S.D.N.Y. July 11,
1991).
126. S. REP. NO. 102-294, at 33 (1992); see also H.R. REP. NO. 102-780, pt. 1, at 19
(1992) (the “compromise is embodied in the [proposed] legislation.”).
127. Compare H.R. REP. NO. 102-873, pt. 1, at 29-30 (1992), with 17 U.S.C. § 1004.
128. Several commentators have proposed the imposition of a levy to compensate copyright owners for revenues lost as a result of peer-to-peer file sharing. Under one such proposal, the amount of the levy would be arrived at through political compromise. See Neil
Weinstock Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File
Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 44 (2003) (“The amount of the [levy] would be determined (and periodically adjusted) through negotiations between associations representing
the industries upon which the levy is imposed and associations representing holders of
rights in different categories of works.”). Other proposals are vague about how the amount
of the levy would be determined. See Ku, supra note 36, at 312-14; Jessica Litman, Sharing
and Stealing, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 40-42 (2004).
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D. Cap and Trade
Another regulatory response to externalities that might be considered as a means of controlling TPM usage is a system of tradable
permits allowing the holder to engage in the regulated activity, often
referred to as “cap and trade.”129 This approach had its origin in the
context of environmental regulation. The system is conceptually very
simple—consisting of (1) a legal prohibition on engaging in the regulated activity except as provided in a permit assigned to the entity
that engages in the activity; (2) an initial allocation to regulated entities of permits allowing them to engage in a certain quantity of the
regulated activity; and (3) a provision for the transferability of the permits, allowing regulated entities to buy and sell permits in a market.130
The principal advantage offered by the system is that (at least in
theory) it brings about the desired level of the regulated activity at a
lower social cost than other systems of regulation. It does this by taking advantage of the fact that some entities can reduce their level of
the regulated activity at a lower cost than other entities. Transferability of the allowances enables a shifting of the desired conduct to
entities that can engage in it at the lowest cost.131
A well-established implementation of the cap-and-trade system is
the acid rain reduction program, created by the Clean Air Act132 and
administered by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.133 The
program is designed to reduce the quantity of sulfur dioxide (SO2)
emitted by utilities in the generation of electricity.134 Each year, the
EPA assigns to each generating unit a quantity of allowances permitting it to emit a certain amount of SO2 during that year.135 A utility
that expects to emit more SO2 than it is allowed may come into compliance either by reducing its emissions or by buying the right to
emit more than its allowance. Conversely, a utility that emits less
than its allowance may either relax its emission-control efforts or
may sell the right to emit the unneeded portion of its allowance.136 If
an over-emitting utility would have to pay more to reduce its emis-

129. See James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607, 617-18 (2000).
130. Id.
131. See Jeffrey M. Hirsh, Emission Allowance Trading Under the Clean Air Act: A
Model for Future Environmental Regulations?, 7 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 352, 354-55 (1999).
132. 42 U.S.C. § 7651 (2000).
133. The EPA’s regulations are at 40 C.F.R. 72-79 (2006).
134. 42 U.S.C. § 7651. The program also aims at reduction of nitrogen oxide emissions,
but not through a system of tradable allowances.
135. The total quantity of allowances will decline from 9.5 million in 2004 to 8.95 million in
2010, each allowance permitting discharge of one ton of SO2. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ACID
RAIN PROGRAM 2004 PROGRESS REPORT 4-5 [hereinafter ACID RAIN PROGRESS REPORT], available at http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/progress/docs/2004report.pdf.
136. See Hirsh, supra note 131, at 354.
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sions by a ton than an under-emitting utility would gain through relaxing its emissions control by the same amount, then both utilities
can benefit from a transfer of a one-ton permit.137 The transfer also
results in a social benefit, since by hypothesis the emission reduction
will be accomplished through a lower expenditure of resources than if
the over-emitting utility was required to reduce its emissions.
An analogous system of tradable allowances could be applied to
publishers using TPMs. The regulator would begin by setting an aggregate TPM budget—that is, determining what quantity of allowances for TPM-generated negative externalities would be allocated to
publishers. Establishing a valid metric would be the first hurdle.
Without a metric, it would be impossible for the regulator to specify
what types of TPM usage an allowance allows or to assess a publisher’s compliance with the limitations created by the allowance system. The premise of a cap-and-trade system is that the aggregate
output of the regulated activity is unchanged by the transfer of allowances from one regulated entity to another. The regulator must
therefore have a criterion for determining whether the entity acquiring an allowance engages in the same quantity of the regulated activity as the original holder of the allowance was allowed.
In the present context, identifying an adequate metric for TPMs
would be quite difficult.138 The regulator would in principle have to
determine the economic value of the externalized harm resulting
from any given use of a TPM. The magnitude of that harm would
vary not only with the type of TPM (for example, tethering versus
anticopy technologies) but also with the content of the TPM-protected
work. For example, a tethering control on a tax-preparation software
program might create less harm (through elimination of a secondary
market) than the same control on a word-processing program, since
the former has value to users only during a limited time period while
the latter may have value indefinitely.

137. The price at which the allowance changes hands depends on the market. For example, suppose that Utility A must reduce its emissions by one ton of SO2 and that Utility
B currently emits one ton less than it is allowed. To reduce its emissions by that one ton,
Utility A would have to install pollution-control equipment costing $1,000. If it chose to
emit an additional ton, Utility B would save $500 in pollution-control costs. Under this
scenario, both utilities would be made better off by Utility B’s sale of a one-ton permit to
Utility A at some price between $500 and $1,000. In a well-functioning market, the price
will depend on the aggregate supply and demand of the permits. Trading of allowances is
active. In 2004, 7.5 million allowances were transferred between economically unrelated
parties. See ACID RAIN PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 135, at 6-8.
138. I have previously suggested that for purposes of analysis a metric could be developed through operation of a “shadow market” that measures consumer antipathy to particular TPM implementations. See Rothchild, supra note 47, at 518 n.107. But this methodology would fail to capture the externalized harms from TPM use that, by definition, are
not of concern to the user of a TPM-protected item.
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However, difficulty in identifying an appropriate metric is not
unique to this context. The same problem surfaces when devising
cap-and-trade programs to control environmental pollutants. For example, acreage is the simplest metric to employ in measuring wetlands, but depending on the policy objective in preserving wetlands,
one acre is not necessarily the equivalent of another. Thus, a capand-trade program that uses acreage as the metric will not necessarily preserve the environmental benefits of wetlands at which the program is aimed.139 Even where the regulated activity is fungible in nature, there may be nonfungibilities along the dimensions of time and
space that a given metric fails to account for adequately.140 Thus,
even though a ton of SO2 is physically the same no matter which utility plant emitted it, using tons of SO2 as the metric for the acid rain
program disregards the consequences of concentrating emissions at
particular times or in particular locations.
In the face of these difficulties, we could not hope to identify and
implement a metric for TPM externalities that perfectly captures the
externalized effects of TPM usage. But perfection is an unrealistic
goal for regulation of any sort. It may be possible to devise a cap-andtrade program for TPMs that, like the regime of legal protection for
intellectual property, is based on a combination of econometrics, politics, estimation, and conjecture, without any pretense of perfection.
The effect of a well-functioning cap-and-trade program for TPMs
would be to shift TPM usage away from publishers that get relatively
little benefit from TPMs and toward publishers that get a relatively
large benefit. Those that benefit relatively little (on a per-unit-ofexternal-harm basis) are better off selling their allowances and forgoing use of TPMs, while other publishers are better off buying allowances so that they can use more TPMs.
V. CONCLUSION
In this Article I have argued that in the absence of any regulatory
limits on the use of TPMs, profit-maximizing publishers will implement TPMs at an inefficiently high level. Regulatory action aimed at
making publishers take into account some of the externalized harms
caused by TPMs is justified on the basis of two analogies. First, public policy as embodied in the legal regimes of intellectual property
protection allows authors, inventors, and producers generally to internalize some of the positive externalities resulting from their ef139. See Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 129, at 631 (“If our principal objective in wetlands protection is conservation of open space, then acres may be an adequate currency for
a wetlands [environmental trading market]. If the goal is conservation and delivery of services, then acres fare poorly.”).
140. Id. at 638-42.
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forts; requiring publishers to internalize some of the negative externalities of TPMs seems equally justified. Second, public policy requires other classes of entities generating negative externalities—in
particular, polluters—to internalize some of the resulting costs; consistency calls for placing the same requirement on publishers.
Of the several possible regulatory approaches I consider, traditional command-and-control regulation is not the best choice because
it fails to take advantage of information held by market participants,
and Coasean bargaining is impractical due to the large number of interested parties and consequent high bargaining costs. Pigouvian
taxes and cap-and-trade both do a better job of incorporating marketplace intelligence. There is no clear basis for preferring one over
the other. In the absence of any more definitive criterion, I propose a
cap-and-trade program as the more market-oriented of the two. Each
of the suggested approaches has its drawbacks, but that is not a reason for abandoning the project. In the real world, perfect regulation
is as rare as a perfectly effective TPM.
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APPENDIX A
The equation in Part II(C)(2) is derived as follows:
A producer’s average total cost (ATC) consists of the total cost of
manufacturing a given quantity of output divided by that quantity.
The total cost of manufacturing (TC) is the sum of two components:
the producer’s fixed cost (FC) and its total variable cost (VC). Thus,

TC (q) FC  VC (q),
where q represents the quantity of output.
If we represent the original producer’s fixed costs as FCop, then
the amount of these costs that the second comer is able to avoid is

A  FCop ,
where 0 < A < 1.
We can now compare the total costs of the original producer with
those of the second comer. The original producer’s total cost is

TCop

FCop  VCop .

The advantage the second comer gains by his copying consists of
the value it is able to appropriate minus what it costs to accomplish
the appropriation, namely

A  FCop  CEsc ,
where CEsc is the second comer’s copying expenses.
If we assume that the original producer and the second comer experience identical variable costs (that is, VCop = VCsc), then this expression also represents the second comer’s comparative advantage:

TC op  TC sc

( FC op  VC op )  ( FC sc  VC sc )

( FC op  VC op )  ( FC op  [ A  FC op  CE sc ])  VC sc )
A  FC op  CE sc .
The percentage of the second comer’s savings is the amount of those
savings divided by the original producer’s costs, or

A  FCop  CEsc
FCop  VCop

.
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APPENDIX B
The use of taxes to correct misallocations of resources resulting
from externalities may be illustrated graphically. In Figure 1, line
MBp is the marginal benefit that a producer obtains as it shifts to increasingly polluting production methods. The quantity of pollution
that is optimal for the producer is q, where the marginal benefit is
zero—increasing the level of pollution beyond q means incurring
costs that exceed benefits, and polluting at a level less than q means
forgoing some net benefits. Line MCv shows the marginal cost to victims of the pollution at different levels of pollution. The socially optimal level of pollution is qĻ, which is less than q. At this level, the
marginal cost to the producer of reducing pollution equals the marginal benefit to the victims. The producer can be induced to reduce
its pollution emissions to qĻ by imposition of a tax in the amount of t.
A tax at that level shifts the producer’s marginal benefit curve from
MBp to MBĻp, which makes qĻ the optimal level of pollution for both
the producer and society.
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